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INTRODUCTION 
As even many of its supporters would agree, the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA),1 the piece of legislation that transforms healthcare 
finance in the United States, is an extraordinarily complex law.2 The 
                                                     
 * Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., 
Princeton University, 1979; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983. 
 1. What people generally call the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is actually 
two laws, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) enacted shortly thereafter.  
 2. See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, ObamaCare Author: Health Law Is ‘Really 
Complicated,’ THE HILL (Dec. 3, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/ 
senate/225812-harkin-dems-better-off-without-obamacare [https://perma.cc/A2YE-
6ZRK] (quoting leading proponent of law as stating, “What we did is we muddled 
through and we got a system that is complex, convoluted, needs probably some 
corrections and still rewards the insurance companies extensively”); Alice M. 
Rivlin, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: Why Is This So Complex?, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (July 8, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/up-front/posts/2013/07/08-affordable-care-act-implement-health-rivlin 
[https://perma.cc/PK77-ZD5L] (arguing that “[t]he complexity is created by our two 
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ACA is like many examples of high-numbered versions of software 
first written years ago. It attempts to maintain a good degree of 
backwards compatibility with existing health insurance regulations 
while seeking to add numerous new features and, at times, undo 
architectures such as medical underwriting now judged to be a 
mistake. In the software industry,3 and as the ACA demonstrates in 
law, such efforts generally result in far more complex products than 
might exist were one able to design from scratch. 
One idea behind the ACA is that insurers should retain some 
freedom to evolve health insurance products that the marketplace 
suggests would best meet the needs of consumers.4 Another idea, 
however, is that consumers should be able to make at least somewhat 
informed choices among these evolving products.5 They should do so 
based on their own needs and preferences for financial risk and for 
choice in the selection of medical professionals.  
These twin ideas of freedom and choice rest in practical 
tension. This opposition occurs because the insurance product has at 
least three separate problems that create unavoidable complications 
in the drafting of coverages, conditions, and exclusions: (1) moral 
hazard—the proclivity of insurance to increase the frequency of 
insured events; (2) adverse selection—the tendency of people who 
believe, usually accurately, they have disproportionately high risk to 
purchase insurance; and (3) correlated risk—the hazards posed to an 
insurer when insured events are not “statistically independent” health 
insurance products.6 True comprehension of almost all forms of 
privately developed insurance may take years of education.  
American health insurance has traditionally reduced this 
tension through use of intermediaries. Most consumers, be they 
                                                                                                                
traditions of relying on private markets whenever possible and preserving diversity 
at the state level”). 
 3. See BARRY BLUNDELL ET AL., COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS 196 
(Walaa Bakry ed., 2007). 
 4. See SABRINA CORLETTE, JOANN VOLK, ROBERT BERENSON & JUDY 
FEDER, THE CENTER ON HEALTH INSURANCE REFORMS, NARROW PROVIDER 
NETWORKS IN NEW HEALTH PLANS: BALANCING AFFORDABILITY WITH ACCESS TO 
QUALITY CARE 5-8 (2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/ 
publication-pdfs/413135-Narrow-Provider-Networks-in-New-Health-Plans.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/P8W7-BP8W] (discussing generally tradeoffs between freedom of 
insurers to sculpt networks and consumer protection). 
 5. See Katherine T. Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted: Obstructive 
Federalism and the Consumer Information Blockade, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 421, 423-28 
(2015). 
 6. For an excellent summary, see Ronen Avraham, The Economics of 
Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29 (2012). 
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individuals or employers, do not just go out and purchase health 
insurance on their own. Nor, despite the excitement it might generate 
for some, do they go out and obtain a degree or certificate in risk 
management. Instead, they place their trust in human intermediaries, 
usually based on reputation and faith in their regulation. To be sure, 
on occasion, as with so-called Medigap policies that supplement the 
insurance provided by Medicare Parts B or C,7 government has 
attempted to reduce the complexity of health insurance products by 
constraining insurer freedom in favor of consumer comprehension. 
The decision to allow only a small set of policy forms drawn from a 
tiny subset of coverage possibilities has, however, been more the 
exception than the rule in health insurance.8 
Thus, as the ACA was being drafted and implemented, the 
question remained as to whether product complexity and consumer 
choice could be reconciled in any other way. This Article is about the 
method Congress suggested and the Obama administration 
implemented to engage with both these goals. In short, the Obama 
administration has tried to preserve both complexity and meaningful 
choice by using a spreadsheet9 to regulate insurance. The spreadsheet 
goes by the name of the Actuarial Value Calculator.10 
                                                     
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (2012). 
 8. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack 
of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 433-36 
(2014) (discussing the problem in general and with specific discussion of Medigap); 
Amanda Starc, Insurer Pricing and Consumer Welfare: Evidence from Medigap, 45 
RAND J. ECON. 198 (2014) (discussing welfare effects of standardization); see also 
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of 
Form Contracts, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 30, 38-40 (2011). 
 9. A spreadsheet may be thought of as a directed graph of computations in 
which the values and bits of programming at each node in the graph are depicted in a 
two dimensional—or in the case of modern “tabbed spreadsheets” like Microsoft’s 
Excel, three dimensional—array. Changing a value or formula in a spreadsheet 
triggers the cascade of computations dictated by the graph structure. Here, for 
example, is the typical presentation of a simple spreadsheet, one that computes the 
end-of-year balance of a bank account given constant interest rates and variable 
contributions at the start of each year. 
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This Article is about three somewhat distinct lessons that can 
be gleaned from regulation by calculator. The first lesson is one of 
theory. Regulation by calculator might, in fact, be a good thing. It 
permits government to construct regulations with complexity levels 
matching the needs of the field, while also permitting private parties 
without insider access to have at least some understanding of the 
relationship between their own conduct and the regulatory 
consequences. Permitting sales of complex products may often be a 
good thing, but it is considerably more of a good thing if the 
government can present a simplified version to consumers that 
actually captures the essential features of the product being 
regulated. 
The second lesson is one of process. If we are going to rely on 
regulation by calculator, we need to construct the Actuarial Value 
Calculator with great care. As courts have sometimes realized when 
looking at formulae, the algorithm, be it one that can be implemented 
by hand and understood through traditional mathematical notation, or 
be it one that can only be understood as an elaborate computation 
                                                                                                                
And here is the directed graph of computations going on behind the scenes. A 
change in cell C3 triggers recomputation of the successor cells C4, C5, and C8.  
 
 10. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT; ACTUARIAL VALUE CALCULATOR METHODOLOGY (n.d.), 
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/av-calculator-methodology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QCE5-YJXW]. 
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written in some computer language,11 essentially becomes the law.12 
It should be constructed in an open and careful process with 
meaningful opportunities for feedback to correct inevitable 
shortcomings.13 As will be discussed here, the Actuarial Value 
Calculator does poorly on this score.  
A third lesson is about a likely collateral benefit of regulation 
by calculator: the liberation of data that can be used for multiple and 
sometimes unintended purposes. In particular, in the most explicitly 
computational part of this Article, I show how the unique healthcare 
claims expense data contained within the Actuarial Value Calculator 
can actually be used to shed light on a problem of great practical 
importance and controversy: whether the significant gross premium 
increases experienced on many healthcare Exchanges over the past 
three years are simply the transitory consequence of the phase out of 
an ACA component known as Transitional Reinsurance. If not, these 
significant increases are more likely to portend a more fundamental 
problem with the ACA’s established system of insurance. I conclude 
that the phase out of Transitional Reinsurance has been a factor in 
gross premium increases but, troublingly, is unlikely to be 
responsible for much of the experienced increase. 
I. THEORY OF REGULATION BY CALCULATOR 
The modern regulatory state runs on computation. Be it the 
computation of personal income taxes,14 the requirements of 
                                                     
 11. Many computations are better expressed in a computer language rather 
than using traditional mathematical notation and equations. See STEPHEN WOLFRAM, 
A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 368 (2002); see also Stephen Wolfram, Mathematical 
Notation: Past and Future (2000), STEPHEN WOLFRAM, http://www.stephenwolfram. 
com/publications/mathematical-notation-past-future [https://perma.cc/9NGC-ANEM] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (describing history of traditional mathematical notation 
and its limitations). 
 12. See State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 634 P.2d 461, 
463 (Nev. 1981); cf. Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1106-07, 
1109-11 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a change in how to count Medicare Part C 
beneficiaries for purposes of computing Medicare reimbursements constituted a 
regulation triggering the Administrative Procedure Act).  
 13. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (discussing the 
dangers of secret algorithms). 
 14. One can view 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) as the top level routine in a massive 
computer program called the Internal Revenue Code that includes what might be 
termed “subroutines” for matters such as the definition of taxable income, 26 U.S.C. 
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environmental statutes,15 reimbursements under the Medicare and 
Medicaid statutes,16 the required capitalization of bank holding 
companies,17 the limitations on pre-funding of various life insurance 
policies,18 or child support obligations,19 our regulations must often 
address a bewildering variety of financial or physical situations and 
collapse them down to a single number or small set of numbers. We 
map from our enormous diversity in financial and personal situations 
down to an amount of tax owed; the outputs of our factory and local 
atmospheric chemistry down to emission limitations; the panoply of 
possible medical conditions and procedures down to a 
reimbursement number; the infinite portfolios of banks and related 
companies down to a measure of the amount that must be held in 
various assets; the varying obligations and benefits under a universal 
life insurance policy down to a limitation on the amount that may be 
                                                                                                                
§ 63, and what might be termed exception handling for matters such as the 
alternative minimum tax.  
 15. See Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-
calculator [https://perma.cc/45AZ-H3PG] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (providing a 
web-based form with computation performed on the server side that lets individuals 
know the effect of various activities on greenhouse gas emissions); National 
Stormwater Calculator, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
water-research/national-stormwater-calculator [https://perma.cc/GQL9-XY98] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2016) (providing a Windows-based program that estimates the 
annual amount of rainwater and frequency of runoff from a specific site anywhere in 
the United States). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2012). 
 17. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.1-.300 (2015). Recently, the government has 
begun distributing its Bank Estimation Tool, Regulatory Capital Estimation Tool for 
Community Banks, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/capital/Bank_Estimation_ 
Tool.xlsm [https://perma.cc/7KWK-42PZ] (last updated Nov. 17, 2014), an 
elaborate, tabbed Excel spreadsheet somewhat akin to the Actuarial Value 
Calculator, to help banks perform the computations needed to determine whether 
they are adequately capitalized. However, the tool itself warns as part of its “splash 
screen,” and in cell A36 of its first tab, that “[n]either this estimation tool nor the 
results derived therefrom may be used for any business or regulatory purpose, 
including regulatory reporting or compliance purposes.” Id. It is thus not quite as 
radical a use of spreadsheets as the Actuarial Value Calculator, which essentially 
does have official status. 
 18. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7702A, 7702B (2012). 
 19. See California Child Support Self Service - Number of Dependents, CA. 
DEPT. OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., https://www.cse.ca.gov/ChildSupport/cse/ 
guidelineCalculator# [https://perma.cc/4WWL-KEY9] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) 
(providing a web-based form with computation performed on the server side that 
computes the child support obligation). 
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contributed each year before losing tax preferred status; and from the 
family, health, and financial situation of a parent down to an amount 
owed on behalf of one’s child.  
All of these are examples of computations that balance various 
regulatory ideas. They likely could be performed using spreadsheets 
and, in some limited cases, are implemented that way. They are 
implemented either through government creation or, in some 
instances, private industry attempting to emulate the regulatory 
structure.  
The mapping down to a small set of values is sometimes 
essential because, notwithstanding the complexity of the world, 
government ultimately demands some well-defined obligation: pay a 
certain amount of tax, pay a certain amount of child support, get a 
certain reimbursement from Medicare. While the concept of “pay 
something or get something that is kind of fair” may work 
satisfactorily in some contexts as a regulatory regime, it can breed an 
awful lot of uncertainty and litigation in many others. We often want 
a single, precise number. 
In other instances, however, the computation specified in a 
statute or regulation or simply in a calculator or web form provided 
by the government may exist predominantly for the purpose of 
communication. Thus, although there is, insofar as my research can 
discover, no restriction on the total carbohydrate content of foods 
sold in the United States, there are nonetheless required complex 
computations that food sellers must make about total carbohydrate 
content that then must appear in a standardized form on nutrition 
labels.20 Ordinary consumers can inspect the labels before 
determining whether the food is worth purchasing without acquiring 
calorimeters, a chemical testing laboratory, and various treatises on 
the necessary computations. The Insurance Regulatory Information 
System (IRIS) score, which the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners21 developed and incorporated into various state 
insurance regulation statutes,22 is another example, although in this 
instance the information consumer is the government itself. 
                                                     
 20. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(6) (2015) (incorporating by reference the 
computations contained in ANNABEL L. MERRILL & BERNICE K. WATT, ENERGY 
VALUE OF FOODS . . . BASIS AND DERIVATION, USDA AGRIC. HANDBOOK NO. 74, at 
2, 3 (slightly rev. ed. 1973)). 
 21. William Campbell Ries, Financial Statement Analysis—IRIS, in 1 
REGULATION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND FIDUCIARY SERVICES § 7:17 (2014). 
 22. See, e.g., IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. § 18.01.66.001.02 (2016); ARIZ. 
ADMIN. CODE § R20-6-308(A)(2) (2012). 
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Basically, IRIS is a vehicle for collapsing a large volume of 
information about the financial condition of an insurer into a small 
set of numbers. There is no absolute requirement that any insurance 
regulator place an insurer into receivership or conservatorship, or 
otherwise impose a sanction if the IRIS scores depart from various 
norms; however, it is valuable information that regulators should and 
often must consider in determining how and whether to supervise a 
licensed insurer.23 Calculators can also serve as instruments of self-
examination in considering reduction of greenhouse gases through 
recycling.24 
And of course, in still further instances, computation serves 
two purposes: to constrain and to communicate simplified 
information. Refrigerators are an example with which many may 
have had experience. Although the actual energy consumed by a 
refrigerator might depend on a variety of factors—ambient air 
temperature, frequency of snacking, amount and type of food and 
beverages stored—the average consumer does not have to acquire 
test equipment or perform thermodynamic computations in order to 
assess its efficiency. The federal government directs refrigerator 
manufacturers to test their equipment and label the machines’ energy 
efficiency,25 and, indeed, it prohibits the sale if the energy efficiency 
exceeds some standard.26  
The Actuarial Value Calculator falls into this latter category of 
use of calculations: it both communicates and constrains. Its main 
purpose is to reduce the complexity of health insurance coverage and 
cost sharing provisions down to a single number: the actuarial value. 
But by outlawing policies whose actuarial values are less than 58% 
or between 62% and 68%, between 72% and 78%, between 82% and 
                                                     
 23. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, INSURANCE 
REGULATORY INFORMATION SYSTEM (IRIS) RATIOS MANUAL 1 (2015), http://www. 
naic.org/documents/prod_serv_fin_receivership_uir_zb.pdf [https://perma.cc/US64-
SS3Y]. 
 24. Recycled Content (ReCon) Tool, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www3.epa.gov/warm/ReCon_home.html [https://perma.cc/4KMC-J9LT] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 25. See 16 C.F.R. § 305.11 (2015) (providing a multi-page description of 
the label that must appear on a refrigerator). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 6295(b)(1) (2012). Automobile safety ratings are another 
example in which the government spares individuals the need to acquire crash 
dummies or perform mechanical engineering computations before purchasing a 
product. The federal government requires that cars be labeled in a standardized way 
and prohibits sale of cars failing the test. See 49 C.F.R. § 575.301 (2015). 
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88%,27 they also implicitly constrain the types of coverages and cost 
sharing arrangements that insurers selling policies on the healthcare 
Exchanges may use.  
Another virtue of regulation using calculators distributed to the 
public is that they eliminate the need for the many shadow 
calculators that individuals create at considerable expense, precisely 
when government has a complex algorithm but does not share it with 
the public. The popular program TurboTax (and similar products) 
exists as an emulator of the tax code and of the computations the 
Internal Revenue Service must perform internally precisely to fill 
this lacuna. Their development has led these entities with large sunk 
costs to somewhat understandably oppose development of public, 
official tax calculators like those that exist in countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden, and Spain.28 Privately created shadow calculators 
abound in fields ranging from Medicare reimbursement29 to subsidies 
and from cost sharing under the ACA30 to the compliance of various 
rooftop heating and air conditioning units with regulatory 
requirements.31 
The Actuarial Value Calculators under study here are 
somewhat unusual,32 however, in that they essentially constitute the 
                                                     
 27. As with almost everything one can say about the ACA, one needs a 
footnote here. Although the permitted “de minimis” variation around the target 
actuarial values is usually plus or minus 2%, see 45 C.F.R. § 156.140(c) (2015), this 
liberality is not always the case. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.400 (defining a 1% plus or 
minus de minimis variation for “silver plan variation[s]”). Moreover, other 
Actuarial Values are permitted for “cost sharing reduction” policies pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 18071(c)(1)(B) (2012). And a 72% conventional Silver plan may not be 
sold if the insurer is also selling a 73% cost sharing reduction Silver plan. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 156.420(f). 
 28. See Liz Day, How the Maker of TurboTax Fought Free, Simple Tax 
Filing, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-
maker-of-turbotax-fought-free-simple-tax-filing [https://perma.cc/U4YW-U5BN].  
 29. See Chip Hart, Free 2016 RVU Calculator, CONFESSIONS OF A 
PEDIATRIC PRAC. MGMT. CONSULTANT, http://chipsblog.pcc.com/free-2016-rvu-
calculator/ [https://perma.cc/ML7N-KKAJ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (providing a 
system that attempts to emulate the reimbursements Medicare gives to providers 
using the “RBRVS” algorithm). 
 30. Health Insurance Marketplace Calculator, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator/ [https://perma.cc/5XFN-J6KH] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 31. Rooftop Unit Comparison Calculator (RTUCC), PAC. N.W. NAT’L 
LABORATORY, http://www.pnnl.gov/uac/ [https://perma.cc/5N8W-4HLD] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 32. The one parallel example I could find in my research appears to be the 
“179D Calculator” created by the United States Department of Energy to determine 
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regulation. Moreover, rather than keep the Calculator behind some 
firewall as is the case for computing personal income taxes, here it is 
distributed for all to see and play with. By distributing the Calculator 
to the public, the government permits sophisticated entities to 
optimize their conduct so that they only barely comply with the 
regulation. This distribution, though possibly equalizing regulatory 
burdens, can also weaken the strength of regulation. 
The peculiarity of public distribution can be seen by 
considering an insurer wishing to sell a “Gold” insurance product on 
the Exchanges. The insurer knows that it will be acceptable if it 
provides anywhere from 78% to 82% actuarial value. Without the 
benefit of the Calculator, the insurer might have some uncertainty as 
to whether its product would comply and, to prevent the costs 
associated with reformulation, might create a safety margin and 
provide a Gold product that provided, for example, 81% actuarial 
value. With a distributed Calculator, a little patience, a sizeable staff, 
and a modest understanding of Excel, an insurer can tweak various 
parameters until it just satisfies the requirement, likely finding a 78% 
actuarial value. An insurer has an incentive to do so because the 
consumer is extremely unlikely to be able to distinguish between a 
78% and 82% Gold product. The consumer just knows it says 
“Gold” on it. So the cost of complete transparency is the ability of 
private entities to strategically exploit regulation to the maximum.33 
Some dare call it “gaming.” 
                                                                                                                
whether various buildings are eligible to obtain a tax deduction for energy 
efficiency. 179D DOE Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://apps1.eere.energy. 
gov/buildings/commercial/179d/ [https://perma.cc/6DAU-ZG2D] (last visited Apr. 
12, 2016). The computation is performed server side using a web-based client but, 
so far as I can determine, the result of the computation appears definitive on the 
issue of whether eligibility exists. I suspect, however, that a more thorough 
exploration of the large universe of federal and state regulations would find many 
other scenarios in which the results of “tweakable computations” were definitive as 
to whether a regulatory requirement was met. 
 33. The failure to provide an application programming interface (API), see 
infra note 63, somewhat limits the ability of insurers to optimize perfectly. Another 
example of distributed computation trading potentially problematic strategic 
behavior in favor of transparency is the “cost sharing calculator” recently provided 
by Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) to those purchasing policies 
on HealthCare.gov. Your Total Costs for Health Care: Premium, Deductible & Out-
of-Pocket Costs, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/ 
your-total-costs/ [https://perma.cc/8Q6F-9EFK] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). The 
prospective purchaser is now asked to state whether they anticipate being a low, 
medium, or high user of medical services. Id. Instead of just producing a premium as 
in previous versions of HealthCare.gov, the server provides the user with an 
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II. THE PROCESS OF CREATING THE ACTUARIAL VALUE 
CALCULATOR 
In its implementation of the Affordable Care Act through 2016, 
the Obama administration neither inserted a large role for human 
insurance intermediaries nor narrowed the set of permissible benefits 
and cost sharing parameters at the federal level in a way that would 
make it simplest for consumers in all states to compare Qualified 
Health Plans sold on the Exchanges.34 It instead permitted insurers to 
compete much as they had before35 with sales directly to 
                                                                                                                
estimated total cost: net premium and expected cost sharing. Id. This computation 
will lead high-cost consumers to favor Gold and Platinum policies more often, while 
leading low-cost consumers to favor Bronze and Silver policies more often. The 
transparency provided by this computation increases the asymmetry of information 
between an insurer and the insured thus exacerbates adverse selection. See Peter 
Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 
YALE L.J. 1223, 1247, 1251, 1279 (2004) (noting that adverse selection depends on 
insureds being able to out-predict insurers). 
 34. Under § 1301(a)(1)(C) of the ACA, an insurer cannot sell a policy on an 
exchange unless it has been licensed by the relevant state. 42 U.S.C. § 18021 (2012). 
Using licensing authority not preempted by the ACA, states have therefore been 
permitted, however, to constrain the diversity of individual insurance policies 
beyond that permitted by federal regulation. About eight states, including California, 
Connecticut, D.C., Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, and Vermont, in 
fact, currently have mandatory standardization. Caroline F. Pearson & Elizabeth 
Carpenter, Proposed Exchange Standardized Benefit Designs Expand First-Dollar 
Coverage for Services and Drugs, AVALERE HEALTH (Jan. 14, 2016), 
http://avalere.com/expertise/life-sciences/insights/proposed-exchange-standardized-
benefit-designs-expand-first-dollar-coverage [https://perma.cc/MZB9-XK6B]. 
Somewhat surprisingly, states in which government officials purport to have great 
hostility to the ACA have not aggressively used their licensing authority to prevent 
insurers from selling policies on the Exchanges. This may change, however, if 
insurers continue to lose large sums of money selling policies. See John Murawski, 
Blue Cross Projects $400M Loss in NC on ACA in Just 2 Years, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Jan. 29, 2016, 6:17 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/ 
article57367343.html [https://perma.cc/L5PW-GV39]. Many states, however, have 
forced insurers to raise premiums above what was requested. See Dan Mangan, 
Oregon Dumps Cold Water on Low Obamacare Rates, CNBC (June 22, 2015, 3:49 
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/22/oregon-dumps-cold-water-on-low-obamacare- 
rates.html [https://perma.cc/QEU5-4E84]; Charles Gaba, Florida: IRONY ALERT!! 
*Approved* 2016 Rate Hikes HIGHER than Requested . . . but Lower than I 
Estimated!, ACASIGNUPS.NET (Aug. 27, 2015, 2:19 PM), http://acasignups.net/ 
15/08/27/florida-irony-alert-approved-2016-rate-hikes-higher-requestedbut-lower-i-
estimated [https://perma.cc/K7BL-7C27]. 
 35. As this Article went to press, the law on this subject changed. In a letter 
to insurance issuers dated February 29, 2016, 2017 LETTER TO ISSUERS IN THE 
FEDERALLY-FACILITATED MARKETPLACES, CTRS. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. 
OVERSIGHT (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-
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consumers.36 Insurers selling Qualified Health Plans in most states 
can select from roughly the same broad span of benefit- and cost-
sharing choices those insurers had collectively deployed in the 
commercial market prior to enactment of the ACA.37 Insurers can 
still choose plan features, such as emergency room deductibles, 
copays on prescription medications, use of coinsurance versus use of 
copays, and “leveling” of providers into various reimbursement 
categories. They can also select those cost sharing expenses that will 
reduce the insured’s applicable deductible and those that will not.38  
                                                                                                                
and-Guidance/Downloads/Final-2017-Letter-to-Issuers-2-29-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
SP6U-XN8B], and in modifications to 45 C.F.R. § 155.205 (2015), the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services announced that starting in 2017, six “standardized 
options” (one Bronze, four Silver, and one Gold) would be brewed up by CMS that 
would have preset cost sharing and benefit constraints. These constraints will 
apparently be uniform throughout the United States even though the value of various 
cost sharing options may vary significantly. Plans that failed to fall within these 
constraints—“standardized options”—would be given a deprecated position on 
HealthCare.gov. Patient Protection and the Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of 
Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 75,488 (Dec. 2, 2015), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/12/02/2015-29884/patient-protection-
and-affordable-care-act-hhs-notice-of-benefit-and-payment-parameters-for-2017#p-
568 [https://perma.cc/2Y9Z-MM3Z]. Issuers would also continue to be prevented 
from selling plans that were similar to one of the preset plans but were not 
“meaningfully different.” 45 C.F.R. § 156.298. It is unclear the extent to which these 
“standardized plans” would thus preempt alternatives that might be somewhat 
similar. The leading industry lobbying group, America’s Health Insurance Plans 
(AHIP), opposes the proposal on grounds that it would restrict consumer choice and 
places too much emphasis on government-chosen standardization. Presumably state 
regulatory authorities would need to approve these standardized options before they 
could be sold. 
 36. To be sure, § 1311(i) of the ACA establishes insurance “Navigators,” 
but these individuals serve mostly as intermediaries or general educators in the 
signup process—how to navigate HealthCare.gov or state-based websites. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18031(i) (2012). It is not generally their job to enlighten consumers on the 
advantages or disadvantages of particular insurance plans in the way that a 
traditional broker or agent might. 
 37. See 42 U.S.C. § 18032(d)(1). 
 38. An insurer may decide to offer a plan in which the “copay”—the 
specific amount an insured pays a provider for a service—does not count towards 
the deductible. One might have a $2,000 deductible before incurring a $50 copay for 
a doctors visit and still have a $2,000 deductible after the $50 copay is made. The 
payment of the $50 would, however, reduce the amount that the insured could still 
be held liable for as a result of the “maximum out of pocket limit.” Thus, if an 
insured could still be held liable for $6,000 before payment of the $50, by virtue of 
making the $50 payment, the most they would thereafter have to pay in cost sharing 
would be reduced to $5,950. Few consumers have an understanding of these 
complexities. LYNN QUINCY, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MAKING HEALTH 
INSURANCE COST-SHARING CLEAR TO CONSUMERS: CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING 
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As noted by Consumers Union39 in a study cited by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services in its February 2012 preliminary 
unveiling of the Actuarial Value Calculator,40 this almost infinite 
flexibility in the selection of plan parameters makes it very 
challenging for consumers intelligently to compare plans. Consumers 
have challenges, for example, assessing the comparative merits of (1) 
Plan A that had low coinsurance for imaging (X-Rays, MRIs) but a 
high emergency room copay that did not apply towards the 
deductible; and (2) Plan B that had higher imaging coinsurance 
requirements but also used leveling with respect to certain medical 
services. Under Plan B, use of some emergency rooms might require 
high copays that did not apply to the deductible, while use of others 
might require low emergency room copays that did.  
The ACA contemplated, however, that consumer plan 
comparison would instead be facilitated by a computation the federal 
government would make.41 The ACA would ultimately collapse this 
infinite variety of benefits and cost sharing parameters into a single 
number: “actuarial value.” In some sense, the contract would be 
simplified on marketing websites such as HealthCare.gov to three 
characteristics: a gross premium, one of four methods of choosing 
providers (Health Maintenance Organization, Extended Provider 
                                                                                                                
HEALTH REFORM’S INSURANCE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (Feb. 2011), http:// 
www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Feb/
1480_Quincy_making_hlt_ins_costsharing_clear_consumers_ib.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/D3TZ-8A67]; George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of 
Health Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850 (2013), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/ 
bmadria/Documents/Madrian%20Papers/Consumers%20Misunderstanding%20of%
20Health%20Insurance.pdf [https://perma.cc/P46Q-UADH]. 
 39. CONSUMERS UNION, CREATING A USABLE MEASURE OF ACTUARIAL 
VALUE (Jan. 2012), http://consumersunion.org/pub/pdf/CU_Actuarial_Value_2012_ 
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR6M-KZZF]. 
 40. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ACTUARIAL VALUE AND 
COST-SHARING REDUCTIONS BULLETIN (2012), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/ 
Resources/Files/Downloads/Av-csr-bulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DZ2-6J4P]. 
 41. In theory, since 2015 a state can develop its own metric to compute the 
actuarial value of a plan sold in that state. 45 C.F.R. § 156.135(d). To do so, the state 
could and likely would then use claims data for its own state. And apparently, early 
dissatisfaction with the calculators led at least some states to consider developing 
their own methodology. In part perhaps because of the regulatory hurdles that need 
to be overcome for a state to use its own methodology, see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON STATE-SPECIFIC DATA FOR THE 
ACTUARIAL VALUE CALCULATOR (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/ 
Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/final-state-avc-guidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8BTC-BHU5], I am not aware of any state that is using anything 
other than the federal Actuarial Value Calculator. 
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Organization, Point of Service, and Preferred Provider), and one of 
four “Metal Levels.” This latter dimension—the Metal Level—itself 
was a direct mapping from one of four percentage values—actuarial 
value—most consumers could use.42 More sophisticated insureds 
could supplement this actuarial value figure with a fine-grained 
examination of the particular cost sharing and benefit parameters. 
The compression of a tremendous amount of complexity into a single 
number is perhaps somewhat analogous to the way U.S. News & 
World Report collapses the variety of widely varying characteristics 
of educational institutions into a single ranking number,43 or the way 
various sports-oriented video games collapse the diverse variety of 
skills held by a player into a single rating.44  
Not only does the ACA provide an actuarial value to qualified 
health plans, but the ACA also makes only certain ratings acceptable. 
The ACA constrains insurers to offer only plans whose “actuarial 
value” takes on one of a small set of discrete values.45 Each of these 
actuarial values corresponds with a supposedly evocative “metal 
level” label going from Bronze (the least generous) through Silver,46 
Gold, and Platinum (the most generous).47 
                                                     
 42. Proponents of the ACA have praised the use of a single number: Louise 
Norris, an author for the pro-Obamacare website healthinsurance.org, writes, for 
example,  
Incidentally, the beauty of the AV regulation is that it makes plans very 
easy to compare to one another. Instead of wading through a vast range of 
plans that differ in myriad ways, consumers can concentrate on factors like 
networks, price, and quality ratings, knowing that the underlying coverage 
of all the plans in the same metal level is very similar.  
Louise Norris, Why Your ACA Health Plan Wasn’t Cancelled, 
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.healthinsurance.org/blog/ 
2014/09/26/why-your-aca-health-plan-wasnt-cancelled/ [https://perma.cc/S3P6-6XTG]. 
 43. See Education Rankings & Advice, U.S. NEWS, http://www. 
usnews.com/education [https://perma.cc/4KG7-KKSW] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 44. FIFA 15 Player Ratings - Top 50, EA SPORTS (Sept. 7, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.easports.com/fifa/news/2014/fifa-15-player-ratings-top-50 [https://perma. 
cc/R2MC-WHV6]. 
 45. In part because it might be nearly impossible for a plan to offer exactly 
80% actuarial value, for example, ACA regulations permit a “de minimis” 
exception. Usually, so long as the computed actuarial value lies within plus or minus 
2% of the statutory figure, the plan is acceptable. 45 C.F.R. § 156.140(c). For certain 
Silver plans, however, there is less flexibility: Insurers must create a plan whose 
actuarial value lies within plus or minus 1% of the statutory figure. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 156.400 (defining the “de minimis variation for a silver plan variation” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 46. The actuarial value of a Silver policy is somewhat confusing. By 
default, the actuarial value is 70%. In practice, however, most Silver policies have a 
higher actuarial value when viewed from the perspective of the insured. This 
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In regulations promulgated by the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) during the first few years the ACA was in 
effect, the Obama administration defined the “actuarial value” of a 
plan as the ratio between (1) the amount the insurer will, on average, 
for some hypothetical “standard population”48 in some hypothetical 
area of the country,49 pay in claims on “essential health benefits” 
provided by that plan relative to (2) the amount that the insurer and 
the insured together will on average pay on such claims.50 Thus, if on 
average the insurer would pay $4,000 in claims on essential health 
benefits on some plan if purchased by a hypothetical population and 
an insured drawn from that population would on average pay $1,000, 
then the “actuarial value” of that plan would be 80% and be labeled 
                                                                                                                
increase occurs because of a program called “cost-sharing reductions” contained in 
§ 1402 of the ACA. 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012). This provision requires insurers to 
provide policies that are labeled “Silver” but that provide 73%, 87%, and 94% 
actuarial value depending inversely on the income of the insured. Id. The Obama 
administration believes Congress appropriated funds to pay insurers the additional 
costs of providing these subsidized policies and has in fact been making those 
payments. Complaint, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-01967, 
2015 WL 5294762 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.speaker.gov/sites/ 
speaker.house.gov/files/HouseLitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH3H-XYWZ]. The 
House of Representatives has sued the Secretary of the Treasury for making those 
payments, saying it never authorized subsidies from the federal government to large 
insurance corporations. See id. at 3. 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d).  
 48. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2)(A); 45 C.F.R. § 156.135(c)-(f). The 
problem with using a uniform “standard population” to compute actuarial value is 
that, for a variety of reasons, including the geographic variation in health costs 
throughout the United States, many plans do not confront standard populations. 
Thus, in theory, the percentage of costs a plan may actually pay for the population 
that actually purchases its product may differ quite significantly from the computed 
actuarial value. A study conducted by the respected Milliman actuarial firm 
confirms that, in fact, these departures are significant and widespread. Gold plans, 
for example, in fact often have cost sharing either well below 80% or well above 
80%. See Pedro Alcocer, Actuarial Value, Benefit Richness, and the Implications for 
Consumers, MILLIMAN (Oct. 29, 2015), http://us.milliman.com/insight/2015/ 
Actuarial-value--benefit-richness--and-the-implications-for-consumers/ [https:// 
perma.cc/23NX-RT6P]. 
 49. CMS appears to have regarded the construction of the hypothetical 
population used in the Actuarial Value Calculators to have been its greatest 
challenge. The pool of insureds who would actually purchase Qualified Health Plans 
on the Exchanges was unknown; moreover plans exactly like those that would be 
sold on the Exchanges were difficult to find. CMS or some entity with which it 
contracted went through an elaborate process of using data on insureds under other 
types of plans to construct what their medical expenses would be under plans with 
the various tiers of actuarial values.  
 50. 45 C.F.R. § 156.20. 
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“Gold.”51 As a result of § 1302(d)(2)(A) of the ACA,52 it does not 
matter whether the pool of insureds purchasing a particular plan 
actually has medical expenses that conform to those of the 
hypothetical pool; the actuarial value of the plan remains constant 
because it is defined as a function of plan design and an imaginary 
population with a fixed distribution of medical expenses. 
To map from the infinite space of cost sharing combinations to 
a single number—actuarial value—is an extremely difficult task. It is 
one that is necessary, however, if insurers are to be permitted 
continued freedom in sculpting policies while ultimately giving 
consumers some coarse ultimate metric with which to compare 
policies. The tool selected by the government to conduct this 
mapping is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet that is revised and reissued 
each year. The spreadsheet is called “The Actuarial Value 
Calculator,”53 into which the insurer inputs upwards of 200 cost 
                                                     
 51. An individual might face what turned out to be quite a different fraction 
of cost sharing than the actuarial value number might prognosticate. Even if the plan 
had an 80% actuarial value (thus defined) and was thus labeled “Gold,” the 
individual with very low medical expenses would end up with a plan that in which 
the insurer paid far less than 80% of covered medical expenses. The insured might 
pay most expenses due to the deductible. Conversely, an individual purchasing that 
same plan who had very high covered medical expenses might end up with a plan in 
which the insurer paid far more than 80% of covered medical expenses. The insured 
might pay a low percentage since all of the policies have a “maximum out of pocket 
limit” (MOOP) that compels insurers to pay 100% of covered expenses after some 
threshold is reached. 
 52. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2)(A) (“Under regulations issued by the 
Secretary, the level of coverage of a plan shall be determined on the basis that the 
essential health benefits described in subsection (b) shall be provided to a standard 
population (and without regard to the population the plan may actually provide 
benefits to).”). 
 53. One can download the Actuarial Value Calculators from CMS at the 
following URLs: (1) 2014 Actuarial Value Calculator, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/ 
Downloads/av-calculator-final.xlsm [https://perma.cc/PJ47-MYFR] (last visited Apr. 
12, 2016); (2) 2015 Actuarial Value Calculator, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/ 
2015-av-calculator-final.xlsm [https://perma.cc/PJ47-MYFR] (last visited Apr. 12, 
2016); (3) 2016 Actuarial Value Calculator, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/ 
Final-2016-AV-Calculator-011514.xlsm [https://perma.cc/PJ47-MYFR] (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2016); and (4) 2017 Actuarial Value Calculator, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/ 
Downloads/Final-2017-AV-Calculator-2017.xlsm [https://perma.cc/PJ47-MYFR] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (still technically a draft). 
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sharing parameters.54 The spreadsheet then uses the fifteen or so tabs 
worth of data it contains along with its embedded “macros”—
basically custom programs buried inside the spreadsheet—to 
compute an actuarial value for the plan. The Actuarial Value 
Calculator then tries to assign the plan to a metal level (or, as it is 
sometimes called, a “metal tier”).  
Figure 1 contains a screenshot of the tab of the spreadsheet on 
which an insurer inputs values. 
Figure 1 
 
We thus have regulation by calculator. If the Calculator pops 
out a Metal Level value for the plan, then the plan is basically 
deemed to satisfy statutory requirements.55 If the Calculator pops out 
an actuarial value for the plan that is not in the requisite ranges, then 
                                                     
 54. Instructions on how to do this are provided in a thirty-page online 
document: CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FINAL 2016 ACTUARIAL VALUE 
CALCULATOR METHODOLOGY (2015), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/ 
Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/Final-2016-AV-Calculator-Methodology.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2TTE-VTLU]. 
 55. 45 C.F.R. § 156.135(a) (“Subject to paragraphs (b) and (d) of this 
section, to calculate the AV of a health plan, the issuer must use the AV Calculator 
developed and made available by HHS for the given benefit year.”). 
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the plan generally may not be sold.56 From a broader perspective, we 
can now have regulations that engage at varying levels of 
complexity. The person who does not want to invest heavily in an 
understanding of insurance and plan complexity can simply look at a 
single number. The person who wants to play in “expert mode” can 
still find out—albeit with some difficulty—far more detail on how 
the plan works. The Calculator thus potentially makes more complex 
regulatory schemes possible while still providing what is, in effect, a 
useful approximation to those with lower information requirements. 
The facilitation of complex regulation that is incomprehensible 
to most without a calculator makes it important that whatever 
simplifying calculator is made available be intelligently and openly 
designed. The Actuarial Value Calculator developed as part of the 
ACA has deficiencies from this standpoint. Although the elements 
that make the Calculator work, and that thus implement the 
regulations, are technically open—one can look at the data and, with 
some skill, disinter the code from within Excel—in fact the system 
and the process by which it was created is quite opaque.  
To begin with, the provenance of the calculator cannot be 
readily determined. It is unknown the extent to which CMS 
performed this work in house and the extent to which it had 
assistance from outside contractors.57 One does not know with any 
                                                     
 56. Id. There are two exceptions. First, to the extent a plan’s parameters 
cannot be entirely shoehorned into the framework of the Actuarial Value 
Calculator—it has special cost sharing rules such as, perhaps, higher level cost 
sharing on weekends—the Actuarial Value Calculator must still be used, but an 
actuary certified by the American Academy of Actuaries must explain the reason for 
the deviation and that the deviation itself reflects sound actuarial principles. 
Therefore, one does not really escape the Actuarial Value Calculator. The second 
exception arises if a state develops its own actuarial value calculator based on state-
specific data. Although this exception might appear to provide a simple escape route 
from whatever deficiencies exist with the CMS-created Actuarial Value Calculator, 
a 25-page “regulatory guidance” issued by CMS creates enormous barriers. These 
hurdles include (1) submission of data and methods two years in advance—thereby 
insuring that the data will be inaccurate; (2) requirements that the continuance tables 
contain at least 100,000 persons per metal tier—thereby deterring small states from 
using the methodology; (3) apparent prohibitions on extrapolation of data on persons 
insured for only part of a year—thereby further limiting the sources of data; and a 
host of other burdens that appear designed to thoroughly discourage any state 
seeking to compete with or correct the federal effort. 
 57. There is some indication that Acumen LLC, a business that describes 
itself as “cater[ing] primarily to federal agencies within the Department of Health 
and Human Services,” and Blue Health Intelligence, a trade name of Health 
Intelligence Company, LLC, an independent licensee of the Blue Cross Blue Shield 
Association, played some role during 2014 in evolving the calculator. See Clients of 
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certainty, therefore, the level of competence of those constructing the 
calculator or whether its creators had any incentives to structure its 
methodologies and output in any particular way. For example, if the 
Calculator generally overstated the aggregate medical expenses of 
individuals, plans would be labeled as more generous than they in 
fact were; a plan labeled as Platinum might in fact provide only a 
Silver or Gold level of benefits. If the Calculator generally 
understated the aggregate medical expenses of individuals, plans 
would be labeled as less generous than they in fact were; a plan 
labeled as Gold might provide a Platinum level of benefits. Not only 
could departures from reality with respect to aggregate medical 
expenses result in erroneous labeling, but because cost sharing 
depends on the interplay of distributions for many kinds of medical 
expenses—emergency room visits, imaging costs, pharmaceutical 
costs—errors, (inadvertent or otherwise) in any of those 
distributions, could result in the wrong metal level being affixed on 
the policy. Comments on the Actuarial Value Calculator as initially 
unveiled to correct any problems were not supposed to go to an 
identifiable human but rather to a general email address. The Federal 
Register generally creates greater accountability by identifying a 
specific human being to whom questions or comments on some 
section of a proposed regulation may be sent. 
Second, the data used in the spreadsheets is described rather 
poorly,58 and the process by which the data was developed is only 
                                                                                                                
Acumen, ACUMEN, http://www.acumenllc.com/clients/default.html [https://perma.cc/ 
YM7S-RDUK] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016); HHS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services $10.5m Acumen, LLC, GOVTRIBE, https://govtribe.com/contract/award/ 
gs10f0133s-hhsm500201100124g [https://perma.cc/AE4Z-PRY2] (last visited Apr. 
12, 2016) (listing Acumen as receiving over $4 million from CMS to use “BHI data” 
to develop a standard population as part of the Actuarial Value Calculator). The 
payments to Acumen came as “modifications” of a rather distinct contract to work 
on the Medicare Prescription Drug Rebate program and thus are unlikely to have 
been the subject of any competitive bidding. Id. It appears that Acumen received 
$117 million from CMS during the period 2013-2016. Acumen, LLC Burlingame CA 
(DBA Medric), GOVTRIBE, https://govtribe.com/vendor/acumen-llc-burlingame-ca-
dba-medric [https://perma.cc/53HF-D57B] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). I could not 
find any information, however, on who may have performed the earlier work in 
2012 when the calculator was first developed. The American Academy of Actuaries 
contributed to some of the ideas that found their way into the calculator. See AM. 
ACAD. ACTUARIES, ISSUE BRIEF: ACTUARIAL VALUE UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT (2011), http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/Actuarial_Value_Issue_Brief_ 
072211.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8D3-RJG9].  
 58. The data is described in ACTUARIAL VALUE CALCULATOR 
METHODOLOGY, supra note 10, a publication of the federal Department of Health 
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sketched in that document and, insofar as can be determined, was not 
the subject of prior notice. There is no technical appendix showing 
how this was done nor is there any sample data provided from which 
the methods selected by the executive branch might be replicated or 
criticized. It is, for all intents and purposes, a black box. Whether the 
underlying data is accurate or not is essentially impossible to assess.  
Not only is the data essentially impossible to assess, so too is 
the programming that, in combination with the data and user input, 
produces the purported actuarial value of the plan. Whether the 
Calculator conforms to the regulations or actually calculates what is 
intended is extraordinarily difficult to determine.59 The code, written 
in Visual Basic for Applications—a Microsoft proprietary language 
not generally known for building complex applications—contains no 
hints or “comments” that explain its meaning or purpose.60 This 
absence of explanation is contrary to Microsoft’s own 
recommendations61 and is almost universally considered poor 
                                                                                                                
and Human Services. The document focuses substantially on why the sample it 
selected on which to base the calculator, a commercial and non-public dataset that 
looked at employer-based plans and individual plans, and the effort to reverse 
engineer cost sharing parameters out of the dataset. There is also significant 
discussion of how to weight the data by the age and gender of the insured, how to 
cost out benefits required by the ACA but not included in many of the studied plans, 
and how to impute a “metal level” and actuarial value to each of the plans studied. 
 59. It is hardly uncommon for Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to contain 
coding errors, even when prepared by respected academics from the most 
prestigious institutions. See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Meet the 28-Year-Old Grad Student 
Who Just Shook the Global Austerity Movement, NYMAG.COM (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/04/grad-student-who-shook-global-austerity- 
movement.html [https://perma.cc/3DAQ-FZNL] (describing error by Harvard 
professors in spreadsheet).  
 60. A suspicious mind would be entitled to wonder whether those who 
wrote the code deliberately removed documentation in order to prevent assessment 
or reverse engineering. I have extensive experience in computer programming, and I 
find it extremely difficult to believe that a single individual wrote this code during 
the time frame between the unveiling of the idea, February 2012, and the release of a 
working draft in November 2012. If multiple individuals were involved in the 
programming, it would have been virtually essential that the code have been 
documented so that each could communicate to the other what the various code 
components were doing and how they might interface with other components.  
 61. Comments in Code (Visual Basic), MSDN.MICROSOFT.COM, https:// 
msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bx185bk6.aspx [https://perma.cc/2BJE-BE9J] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (“It is good programming practice to begin all 
procedures with a brief comment describing the functional characteristics of the 
procedure (what it does). This is for your own benefit and the benefit of anyone else 
who examines the code.”); MICROSOFT, SPREADSHEET COMPLIANCE IN THE 2007 
MICROSOFT OFFICE SYSTEM (2006), http://download.microsoft.com/download/a/e/5/ 
 Regulation by Calculator 485 
programming practice.62 The only English language material that 
might contend for status as “documentation” is an explanation of the 
sequence of computations contained in a November 2012 document 
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Actuarial Value 
Calculator Methodology” released by CMS, but there is no mapping 
provided between the computations sketched in that document and 
                                                                                                                
ae5f12c6-419d-43bd-937f-f9af7a820c32/BI_Whitepaper_SpreadsheetCompliance 
[https://perma.cc/73FJ-XGLM]. 
 62. See generally ROBERT C. MARTIN, CLEAN CODE: A HANDBOOK OF 
AGILE SOFTWARE CRAFTSMANSHIP (2009). 
  Here is an example of some inscrutable uncommented code contained in 
one of the thousands of lines of macro code:  
If Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row, (6 + multiply)).Value <> “.” Then 
ded_amt = Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply)).Value + (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row, (6 + 
multiply)).Value - Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply)).Value) * ded_ppt 
ded_freq = Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value + (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value - Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value) * ded_ppt 
If coins_var = 2 And Sheet1.CheckBoxes(“ofv_copay_limit”).Value = 1 
Then 
ded_amt = Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply_ofv)).Value + (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row, (6 + 
multiply_ofv)).Value - Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply_ofv)).Value) * ded_ppt - ded_amt 
ded_freq = Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply2_ofv)).Value + (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row, (6 + 
multiply2_ofv)).Value - Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply2_ofv)).Value) * ded_ppt - ded_freq 
End If 
If Sheet1.CheckBoxes(“lesser_of”).Value = 1 And ded_freq > 0 Then 
If ded_amt / ded_freq < Sheet1.Range(cellvalue2).Value Then 




oop = oop - copay_amt * (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value + (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value - Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(ded_row_low, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value) * ded_ppt) 
If coins = 1 Then 
eff_coins = eff_coins + (((Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(88, (6 + 
multiply)).Value) / (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(88, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value) - copay_amt) * (Worksheets(Sheetstr).Cells(88, (6 + 
multiply2)).Value)) 
End If 
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the actual code contained in the spreadsheet’s macros. There is also 
no obvious application programming interface (API)63 by which the 
code can be subjected to automated testing that has become fairly 
standard in the software industry64 or that would permit insurers 
contemplating plans designed to do anything better than hand-craft 
and hand-tweak their proposed policies.65  
Worse still, there is internal inconsistency in the data contained 
in the Calculators. There are two columns in the data that should 
have an indisputable mathematical relationship to each other. 
Column C contains, for each bucket into which “total allowed 
charges” are grouped, what purports to be the mean of the 
distribution of total allowed charges but with values censored not to 
lie above the top of each bucket. Column D contains, for each bucket 
into which “total allowed charges” are grouped, what purports to be 
the mean of the distribution of total allowed charges with no 
censoring. Mathematically, then, one can derive Column C from 
                                                     
 63. An API may be thought of as a method that permits computer programs 
to speak with each other. Right now, to get an Actuarial Value of 70%, an insurer 
must essentially input values into the calculator, see the result and then make a guess 
as to what economically sensible alternations of the 200 parameters might cause the 
result to move towards the 70% value. An API would permit an insurer to have the 
computer throw a variety of cost sharing parameters at the Calculator and have it 
return for further analysis a list of actuarial values. An API would essentially turn 
the Actuarial Value Calculator into a function that could be called from another 
program, one not necessarily written in Visual Basic for Applications but perhaps 
public domain languages, such as R or Python or Java, or powerful proprietary 
languages, such as MATLAB or The Wolfram Language (Mathematica). Such an 
architecture would permit the logic of the calculator to be probed more efficiently 
and let insurers develop emulators that would let them understand and, if need be, 
criticize the models that are now latent within the calculator. One actuary apparently 
attempted to get around this problem by attempting to hack the Calculator. See 
Actuarial Value Calculator Is Posted [Archive], ACTUARIAL OUTPOST (Nov. 23, 
2012), http://www.actuarialoutpost.com/actuarial_discussion_forum/archive/index. 
php/t-251605.html [https://perma.cc/762L-PFP6] (discussing efforts to “de-VBA-ify 
the spreadsheet”). 
 64. See generally DOROTA HUIZINGA & ADAM KOLAWA, AUTOMATED 
DEFECT PREVENTION: BEST PRACTICES IN SOFTWARE MANAGEMENT (2007). See also 
Dudekula Mohammad Rafi et al., Benefits and Limitations of Automated Software 
Testing: Systematic Literature Review and Practitioner Survey, PROC. 7TH INT’L 
WORKSHOP ON AUTOMATION SOFTWARE TEST, June 2012, at 36, 36. 
 65. Some actuaries evidently tried to test the 2014 version of the software 
and found bizarre errors: reducing the amount the insurer paid ended up, in some 
situations, increasing the actuarial value of the plan. See Actuarial Value Calculator 
Is Posted, supra note 63 (containing discussions of “afg5008,” “lifishing007,” and 
“bamafan” on thread on February 20, 2013). It is not clear whether this particular 
bug was ever fixed by CMS. 
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Column D using the following formula: ܥ݆ ൌ
σଵஸ௜ஸே ൫ ௜݂ ݉݅݊൫ܦ௜ǡ ݐ௝൯൯, where ݅ is an index over the N buckets 
into which the data is grouped; ௜݂ is the probability an individual 
falls into the ݅th bucket; ܦ௜ is the value in Column D for the ݅th 
bucket; and ݐ௝ is the highest value in bucket ݆. Unfortunately, try as 
one might, Column C simply cannot be derived from Column D. One 
must therefore conclude that one of the columns of data is not correct 
or, more likely, that the documentation describing the data is 
flawed.66 Neither alternative is particularly comforting. 
In short, if spreadsheets such as the Actuarial Value Calculator 
are the same as law, then they need to be treated as law by executive 
agencies. This means applying the full protections of the 
Administrative Procedure Act and other federal contracting statutes 
to the creation of the spreadsheet, including an opportunity for 
meaningful feedback. Inadequate code documentation, opaque 
procurement procedures, failure to provide information on the 
transformation of data, and an effective inability to test the code—all 
of which occurred and continue to occur with the Actuarial Value 
                                                     
 66. Here is the explanation of Column C taken from CMS’s memorandum 
describing the 2016 Actuarial Value Calculator. Essentially identical language is 
used in describing preceding Calculators. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
supra 54, at 13.  
The continuance tables rank enrollees by allowed total charges (after any 
provider discounts but before any member cost-sharing) and group them 
by ranges of spending. These ranges of spending define the rows of the 
continuance table. The data are then used to calculate the number of 
enrollees with total spending falling within each range, the cumulative 
average cost in the range for all enrollees, and the average cost for all 
enrollees whose total spending falls within the range. 
Id. CMS provides a similar explanation in its “do-it-yourself” memorandum 
provided to the states in the event they wished to build their own actuarial value 
calculator. See CENTER FOR CONSUMER INFORMATION & INSURANCE OVERSIGHT, 
STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON STATE-SPECIFIC DATA FOR THE ACTUARIAL VALUE 
CALCULATOR (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Downloads/final-state-avc-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/G95X-
KL3Z]. Avg. Cost per Enrollee (Max’d): This is the average spending of all 
enrollees in the dataset, if enrollees that spent above the bracket limit were top-
coded to the value of the bracket limit. This is equal to [(total spending of all 
enrollees with spending up to bracket) + (total number of enrollees – number of 
enrollees up to bracket) * (bracketupper limit)]/total n. The computation described 
here is precisely the one I have done on the data provided, except that the numbers 
that result do not match the numbers one obtains from the formula. Efforts to speak 
to appropriate persons at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services about this 
issue were unsuccessful. 
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Calculator—provide far too much discretion to even the best 
intentioned executive agencies. 
III. USING THE ACTUARIAL VALUE CALCULATOR TO ASSESS 
TRANSITIONAL REINSURANCE 
Notwithstanding these issues, the evolution of the Actuarial 
Value Calculator is still immensely useful for understanding the 
Affordable Care Act and the state of American healthcare. For one 
thing, the data the spreadsheets contain is an unprecedented treasure 
trove of information previously locked up, essentially as insurer 
trade secrets,67 as to the distribution of medical expenses in aggregate 
and various subcategories among the American public. As discussed, 
this data may not be fully accurate, but for some purposes it is better 
than the nothing that otherwise exists for many researchers in the 
field.  
Not only does the Actuarial Value Calculator provide 
information on the distribution of claims within a given year, the 
sequence of Actuarial Value Calculators that will be produced each 
year should provide valuable information on the healthcare 
Exchanges established by the ACA that currently provide health 
insurance to about 12 million Americans, perhaps more in the 
future.68 Whether the ACA is, as many fear, heading into a death 
spiral and, if so, the particular physics of that spiral are strongly 
                                                     
 67. If one looks at the UNITEDHEALTHCARE INS. COMPANY, FEDERAL RATE 
FILING JUSTIFICATION PART III ACTUARIAL MEMORANDUM & CERTIFICATION FOR 
UNITED HEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY STATE OF KENTUCKY RATE REVIEW 
(2015), https://insurance.ky.gov/ratefil/RFDocuments/2015-005963-R_3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XC6-HSAL], for example, which purports to justify an insurer’s 
decision to raise rates for plans sold pursuant to the ACA, one sees massive portions 
redacted to preserve proprietary information.  
 68. The Congressional Budget Office most recently estimated that about 13 
million people would be enrolled in Qualified Health Plans on the Exchanges during 
2016. Even if these estimates, like many other CBO estimates concerning the ACA, 
are incorrect, see, for example, Seth Chandler, CBO Projection of $8 Billion from 
Risk Corridors Is Baffling, ACA DEATH SPIRAL (Feb. 7, 2014), http://acadeathspiral. 
org/2014/02/07/cbo-projection-of-8-billion-from-risk-corridors-is-baffling [https:// 
perma.cc/28YP-TEXX] (noting, correctly as it turns out, that the CBO’s estimate 
that an ACA program known as Risk Corridors would earn $8 billion for the 
government was baffling; in fact Risk Corridors lost about $2.5 billion); DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RISK CORRIDORS PAYMENT PRORATION RATE FOR 2014 
(2015), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Premium-Stabilization-
Programs/Downloads/RiskCorridorsPaymentProrationRatefor2014.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/RH7U-CCVH], still the number of those enrolled will be substantial. 
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hinted at by the evolving Actuarial Value Calculator. We can assess, 
for example, the effects of changes in a program known as 
Transitional Reinsurance69 using the Actuarial Value Calculators.  
I now examine two issues clarified by the series of Actuarial 
Value Calculators created pursuant to the ACA. First, I look at the 
evolution of claims in the first years of the ACA. I show that claims 
are increasing for all metal tiers. Second, I look at the effects of the 
phase out of the Transitional Reinsurance program. 
A. The Evolution of Claims in the Early Years of the Affordable 
Care Act 
The data in the Actuarial Value Calculator contains the 
government’s estimates of the expenses insurers are likely to face on 
average when they sell policies in the exchange in a given year. The 
composite graphic below shows the changes in the mean expected 
claim for each of the four metal groups for the period 2014 to 2017. 
The top panel shows the increases in graphical form. The bottom left 
panel shows the expected claims for each of the four metal levels in 
each of the four years for which we have an Actuarial Value 
Calculator with continuance tables. The bottom right panel shows the 
average annual rate of increase for the four metal levels, which is 
between 6.3% and 6.4%. There is no increase between 2014 and 
2015 because CMS, the agency that ended up with regulatory 
authority over the matter, felt it did not have adequate data as of 
early 2014 to warrant a change.70 The 2016 increases shown below 
are thus, in some sense, a form of “catch-up” for the failure to update 
in 2015. 
                                                     
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 18061 (2010). 
 70. In 2014, CMS finalized 45 C.F.R. § 156.135(g) (2014), which requires 
the Executive to update the continuance tables to reflect more current claims data 
only every three years and only to “trend” the claims data when the trending factor 
is more than 5% different, calculated on a cumulative basis. It is not clear how one 
can “trend” the claims data, however, without altering the continuance tables or, 
more relevantly, how any result from the Calculator would change unless the 
continuance tables were changed. 
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Figure 2 
EVOLUTION OF EXPECTED CLAIMS  
AS COMPUTED USING THE ACTUARIAL VALUE CALCULATOR 
 
One can also use data from the Actuarial Value Calculators to 
examine the variability of claims for each metal level as they evolve 
over time. Here we see the same temporal pattern: the standard 
deviation gets larger as we move from 2015 through to 2017. And 
the relative ranking of Bronze, Gold, and Platinum remains the same 
as with expected claims. Silver plans consistently have the highest 
variability, however. The reason for Silver’s greater variability is not 
known but possibly occurs because plans that are called “Silver” in 
fact have differing actuarial values (ranging from 70% to 94%), 
depending on the income of the insured and may thus draw from 
medically diverse populations. 
 Regulation by Calculator 491 
Figure 3 
EVOLUTION OF STANDARD DEVIATION OF CLAIMS 
AS COMPUTED USING THE ACTUARIAL VALUE CALCULATOR 
 
Because an exclusive focus on just the mean of a distribution 
loses valuable information, it is also worthwhile to examine the 
distribution of claims themselves for each year and among the four 
metal levels. Figures 4 through 7 show the results. The x-axis on 
each of these graphs shows the size of the claim. The values are log-
scaled for clarity. The y-axis on each graph shows the ratios of the 
probability density function of the claim distribution for each year 
relative to the probability density function of the claim distribution 
for the 2015 baseline. A value greater than 1 means that claims 
around the associated x-value in the given year were denser than they 
were in 2015. A value less than 1 means that the claims were less 
dense around the associated x-value in the given year than they were 
in 2015.  





For Bronze claims, one can see that the claims tended to be 
waited more heavily at the higher levels as one moves from 2016 to 
2015 (represented with solid lines and circular plot markers) and 
from 2017 to 2015 (represented with dashed lines and triangular 
markers). The solid line is below 1 at the lower claim sizes and tends 
to be higher than 1 at the higher claim sizes. The dashed line follows 
the same pattern and tends to show a more dramatic effect. 
We can see the same pattern for Silver, Gold, and Platinum 











One can similarly examine the distribution of claims 
themselves for each metal level among the three years 2015, 2016, 
and (projected) 2017. The same type of graphic is used: The x-axis 
on each of these graphs shows the size of the claim. The values are 
log-scaled for clarity. The y-axis on each graph shows the ratios of 
the probability density function of the claim distribution for each of 
the other metal levels (Silver, Gold, Platinum) relative to the 
probability density function of the claim distribution for the Bronze 
baseline. A value greater than 1 means that claims around the 
associated x-value for the given metal level were denser than they 
were for Bronze. A value less than 1 means that the claims were less 
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dense around the associated x-value for the given metal level than 




The pattern for 2015 is that Silver, Gold, and Platinum are all 
less dense than Bronze among the lower valued claims but generally 
higher for almost all of the upper valued claims. The picture is 
generally as one would expect: Platinum, for most of its upper range, 
has the highest density of claims relative to Bronze; Gold next 
densest; and Silver densest after that. This pattern reflects the sort of 
“induced demand effect” one would expect to see given adverse 
selection issues in which people who expect high medical claims 
tend to purchase plans with less cost sharing, and moral hazard 
problems in which the existence of lower cost sharing tends less to 
deter insureds from utilization of costly medical services. 
Confirmation of induced demand is an unhappy fact for those hoping 
that the ACA will continue to offer meaningful choices of cost 
sharing levels on the Exchanges. There is an inexplicable exception 
for Platinum claims at the highest levels, which the data suggests is 
less dense than Bronze for the highest valued claims.71  
The patterns for 2016 and 2017, as shown in Figures 9 and 10, 
are similar to those for 2015. 
                                                     
 71. This is exactly the sort of peculiarity that would have been easier to 
challenge had better procedures been used for collection and publication of the data. 
See supra Part II. 







B. A Closer Look at Transitional Reinsurance Premiums 
A key provision of the ACA for the first three years in which 
policies are to be sold on the individual Exchanges is something 
called “Transitional Reinsurance.” It is established by § 1341 of the 
statute and, along with “Risk Adjustment” and “Risk Corridors,” is 
one of the so-called “3Rs” that subsidize insurers selling policies on 
the Exchanges established by the ACA.72 It provides insurers selling 
policies on the Exchanges with “specific stop loss reinsurance”73 
                                                     
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 18061.  
 73. Reinsurance comes in many flavors; each of which may have more than 
one name. “Specific stop-loss reinsurance” is a form of reinsurance that tends to 
have the following features. The “specific” nomenclature distinguishes the 
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without any charge to those insurers. As it has been implemented by 
the Obama administration, which may not be precisely what the 
statute called for,74 the reinsurance is triggered when, regardless of 
the reason, an insurer’s payments on behalf of an individual insured 
exceed an “attachment point.” Thereafter, until the payments by the 
insurer hit a cap, the federal government reimburses the insurer for a 
fraction of the amount paid by the insurer for the expenses of that 
particular insured.75  
This “free” reinsurance76 provided under the ACA reduces both 
the cost and risk of providing insurance on the Exchanges. In a 
                                                                                                                
reinsurance from “aggregate” reinsurance. Specific reinsurance is triggered based on 
the amount of a particular claim within a pool of insured claims. Thus, even if 
everyone else in a homeowner pool has no losses and thus the insurer makes an 
unexpected large profit, specific reinsurance may kick in if one homeowner has a 
large claim. Aggregate reinsurance, by contrast, is triggered when losses on some 
portfolio of claims—either the entire pool or some defined subset—incurs larger 
than desired losses. The “stop loss” nomenclature indicates that the purpose of the 
reinsurance is to—not surprisingly—stop insurer losses, but only after some 
threshold level of losses have occurred. It is somewhat akin to insurance with a 
deductible. For a succinct discussion of stop-loss insurance, see Stop-Loss Excess 
Insurance, SIIA: SELF-INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., http://www.siia.org/ 
i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4549 [https://perma.cc/XUB6-NJJT] (last visited May 
16, 2016). 
 74. I have addressed the non-statutory triggers used by the Obama 
administration for Transitional Reinsurance in a lengthy Forbes Magazine blog entry 
here: Seth Chandler, How the Obama Administration Raided the Treasury to Pay 
Off Insurers, APOTHECARY (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
theapothecary/2016/01/18/how-the-obama-administration-raided-the-treasury-to-
pay-off-insurers/ [https://perma.cc/4K57-XMD4]. 
 75. The Transitional Reinsurance program diminishes the risk posed by a 
single individual and, derivatively, diminishes the aggregate risk of selling insurance 
to a pool of individuals. The standard deviation of the sum of similar distributions is 
generally linearly proportional to the standard deviation of a single element of the 
sum. The Risk Corridors program created by § 1342 of the ACA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18062, more directly reduces the aggregate risk of selling insurance in the 
Exchanges by essentially offering insurers a free “derivative security” to hedge risk. 
But see Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, § 227, 128 Stat. 2130, 2491 (preventing government subsidization of Risk 
Corridors for 2015). 
 76. Of course, the insurance is not really “free.” The Transitional 
Reinsurance is funded through an assessment on most other health insurance 
arrangements in the United States. The major exception is health insurance that is 
“self funded” (no commercial insurer involved) where the plan itself determines 
what claims to pay—an arrangement used almost exclusively by labor unions. This 
assessment increases the price of that health insurance and may render it more 
difficult to afford for some individuals. The assessment was $63 per “covered life” 
per month in 2014, $44 per covered life per month in 2015, and $27 per covered life 
per month in 2016. See Chandler, supra note 74. 
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competitive market, it should also reduce the gross premiums for 
health insurance policies sold on the Exchanges, most likely in a 
form that is neither sensitive to the income of the purchaser nor 
redistributive. Had the reinsurance not been available, insurers would 
either have gone without and thereby paid more on claims or would 
have had to pay commercial reinsurers to lower their conventional 
attachment points to provide greater protection.77 Congress might 
then have used the money thus liberated to distribute far greater 
premium subsidies—perhaps as much as 70% more—in an income-
sensitive and redistributive way to prospective insureds78 that would 
have made exchange policies far more attractive. 
The amount allocated by the ACA to pay for Transitional 
Reinsurance phases out between 2014 and 2016, going from a 
maximum of $10 billion for policies sold in 2014 to $6 billion in 
2015 to $4 billion for policies sold in 2016.79 It was thus anticipated 
                                                     
 77. Health insurers frequently purchase specific stop loss reinsurance from 
the commercial market. The Obama administration, perhaps in an effort not to cut 
into the reinsurers’ business, slid the Transitional Reinsurance of the ACA in at a 
lower level in the claims stack than what it asserted was the typical $250,000 
attachment level. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of 
Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2014, 78 Fed. Reg. 15,410, 15,467 (Mar. 11, 
2013) (“The parameters would not interfere with traditional commercial reinsurance, 
which typically has attachment points in the $250,000 range.”); Jane M. Zhu et al., 
The Power of Reinsurance in Health Insurance Exchanges to Improve the Fit of the 
Payment System and Reduce Incentives for Adverse Selection, 50 INQUIRY 255, 255 
(2013), http://inq.sagepub.com/content/50/4/255.full [https://perma.cc/MYE7-
B269]. There is no evidence, however, that if insurers were willing to pay more, 
reinsurers would not be willing to provide reinsurance similar to that afforded by the 
ACA.  
 78. The federal government in fact spent $15.5 billion on premium tax 
credits in 2014. See Affordable Care Act: Interim Results of the Internal Revenue 
Service Verification of Premium Tax Credit Claims, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR 
TAX ADMIN. (May 29, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/ 
201543057fr.html [https://perma.cc/4W9M-BEMK]. If one added the $10 billion in 
scheduled Transitional Reinsurance payments to that sum, $25.5 billion would have 
been available, which is 70% more. Of course, if more people purchased subsidized 
policies as a result, the subsidy per individual would increase less than 70%.  
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 18061(b)(3)(B)(iii). Somewhat mysteriously, as it turns 
out, less has actually been spent thus far on this program than was anticipated. See 
Chandler, supra note 74. This diversion of funds from the Treasury to insurance 
companies is now under active investigation by members of the United States 
Senate. See Letter from Marco Rubio and Orrin Hatch, Senators, U.S. Senate, to 
Jack Lew, Sec’y of the Treasury, and Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/rubio-
hatch-question-administration-on-lawfulness-of-obamacare-reinsurance-payments 
[https://perma.cc/SA59-AGFL]; Memorandum from Cong. Research Serv. to House 
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that the subsidies provided insurers would decline and more of the 
policies’ costs would need to be internalized by the insurers 
themselves and, derivatively, their insureds.  
Figure 11 shows the Transitional Reinsurance parameters for 
each of the three years of the program, both as originally proposed 
and as ultimately implemented. The first column of the table 
identifies a particular reinsurance parameter by the year in which it 
would apply and whether it was an original or final provision.80 The 
second column of the table provides the issue of the Federal Register 
in which the parameters were announced. The third column of the 
table identifies the attachment point. If the amount an insurer paid on 
an individual insured’s claim was less than this amount, nothing was 
paid in reinsurance. The fourth column states the rate at which 
payments in excess of the attachment amount would be paid. A value 
of 0.8 in conjunction with an attachment point of $60,000 therefore 
means that if the insurer paid $70,000 on an individual’s claims for a 
year, the reinsurer would reimburse it $8,000. The fifth column, the 
cap, is the maximum claim to which the reimbursement would apply. 
Thus, if the attachment were again $60,000 and the payment rate was 
0.8, an insurer that paid $300,000 in claims on an expensive 
individual would be treated for reinsurance purposes as if they had 
only paid $250,000. They would thus receive $152,000 in 
reimbursement, which is the payment rate multiplied by the 
difference between the cap and the attachment. 
                                                                                                                
Comm. on Ways & Means & House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 23, 
2016), http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house. 
gov/files/documents/114/analysis/20160223CRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VRE-W4KA]. 
 80. There is not yet a “final” set of reinsurance parameters for 2016. And in 
a development that occurred just before the publication of this Article, it looks as if 
there may be further revisions to the 2015 parameters. This is so because, while only 
$6 billion was supposed to be available for that year, the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services believe it will have $7.7 billion available. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., THE TRANSITIONAL REINSURANCE PROGRAM’S CONTRIBUTION 
COLLECTIONS FOR THE 2015 BENEFIT YEAR 1 (2016), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/ 
Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/RIC_2015ContributionsGuidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9Z4R-L3XN]. Since enrollment for 2015 was somewhat less than 
projected, the combination of 28% more money and a lower number of reinsured 
claims might permit CMS to alter its payment rate on 2015 claims from the 0.5 
“final” number to something closer to the 1.0 number it ended up using in 2014. 
Insurers, who may not have banked on the more generous reinsurance, will thus 
have better bottom lines for 2015. Whether this transient profitability increase will 
be sufficient to induce more of them to stay in the exchange past 2016, when 
Transitional Reinsurance likely expires, remains to be seen. 
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Figure 11 
 
A significant concern about implementation of the ACA has 
been the extent to which gross premiums for policies sold on the 
Exchanges have increased, particularly in the most recent year. How 
serious the situation is depends on how one counts. No single way is 
perfect. Many who have studied the issue believe, however, that 
increases were over 10% and may have been 20% to 30% for the 
more generous subtypes of plans (Platinum and PPO).81 It is doubtful 
                                                     
 81. One logical way of proceeding is to look at the premiums for those 
“persistent plans” sold in both years. This is particularly relevant to people seeking 
to maintain continuity of networks and may reflect the actual costs of providing 
insurance. When this is done, one obtains estimates of increases of 12.1% for 
Bronze plans, 9.4% for Silver plans, 15.2% for Gold plans, and 20.9% for Platinum 
plans. Seth Chandler, Prices Rising, Choice Declining for 2016 Obamacare, ACA 
DEATH SPIRAL (Oct. 31, 2015), http://acadeathspiral.org/2015/10/31/prices-rising-
choice-declining-for-2016-obamacare [https://perma.cc/3R6X-RVZM] (computing 
mean change in premiums between 2015 and 2016 for 6,699 persistent plans sold on 
the federal Exchanges). 
  This methodology, however, did not weight plans on the basis of 
enrollment because that data was not readily available at the time. It also looked 
only at plans sold at HealthCare.gov and not at the smaller fraction of plans sold on 
the various state-based Exchanges. A similar effort by Charles Gaba, a respected 
enthusiast for the ACA, likewise looked at persistent plans and attempted to estimate 
the enrollment of various plans based on state filings. Charles Gaba, 2016 Rate 
Increases: Where Things Stand Nationally/State-by-State (12-14% Overall), 
ACASIGNUPS.NET (Aug. 28, 2015, 11:48 PM), http://acasignups.net/15/08/28/2016-
rate-increases-where-things-stand-nationallystate-state [https://perma.cc/5PSA-74VL]. 
  Mr. Gaba concluded that the average increase between 2015 and 2016 
was between 12% and 14% depending on various details. No effort was made to 
disaggregate the rates of increase among the various metal levels. This method 
likewise assumed, however, that enrollees would keep their plans rather than shop 
and also had the benefit of looking at only two-thirds of the states. Another way of 
proceeding is to look at premiums not for persistent plans but for certain plan 
rankings. The Kaiser Family Foundation, for example, looked at the premium for the 
second lowest Silver plan in various cities throughout the United States. It found a 
premium increase of only 3.6%. Cynthia Cox et al., Analysis of 2016 Premium 
Changes in the Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance Marketplaces, HENRY J. 
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that the ACA can serve all but the low income and those purchasing 
its least expensive policies if this annual rate of increase were to 
continue.  
Causation is important. If the increases between 2015 and 2016 
are due substantially to diminution in government subsidies, this 
causal structure might actually augur favorably for the stability of the 
Exchanges once those subsidies disappear. The engine that has been 
driving those increases—the withdrawal of subsidies—will go away 
and perhaps leave the system in somewhat of a steady state. If, on the 
other hand, the decline in the subsidies play an insignificant role, the 
phenomenon of price increases—particularly in the plans with more 
lavish benefits—are more likely being significantly caused by the 
more healthy shift away from the more lavish plans and either 
choosing not to purchase insurance or selecting one of the less 
generous plans. Such a withdrawal would leave the more lavish plans 
with only the least healthy enrollees, drive prices up, and initiate a 
death spiral that, once complete within the Platinum plans, could 
easily migrate to Gold plans. 
The data embedded within the Actuarial Value Calculators, 
assuming it is accurate, permits us to get somewhat of a handle on 
the causation issue. We can derive our own distribution of healthcare 
expenses and then compute for any arbitrary set of reinsurance 
parameters the amount that free reinsurance reduces insurer costs 
and, derivatively, reduced premiums. We can thus see, for example, 
what premiums would have been in 2015 had the 2014 parameters 
for Transitional Reinsurance remained in effect and what premiums 
would have been in 2016 had either the 2015 or 2014 parameters for 
Transitional Reinsurance remained in effect. 
                                                                                                                
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2015), http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/analysis-
of-2016-premium-changes-in-the-affordable-care-acts-health-insurance-marketplaces/ 
[https://perma.cc/7JQK-F7FP]. 
  This methodology failed to consider plans with different metal levels, 
almost all PPO plans (since these are seldom the lowest or second lowest in a 
category), or plans outside of urban areas. More fundamentally, however, as 
experimentation using Mathematica shows, if the rate of increase for premiums for 
each insurer observes a Geometric Brownian motion process, the rate of increase 
observed for the lowest or second lowest premium each year—the mean of the 
second-order statistics distribution of observations—will understate the average 
increase for the group, particularly when the process operates over short periods of 
time. As the number of observations grows, the understatement grows more 
pronounced. Thus, it could easily both be true that the average rate of increase for 
premiums was 10% and that the rate of increase for the second lowest premium was 
3.6%.  
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Ordinarily, the details of how that computation can be done 
might be buried in a never-read appendix or relegated to another 
excessively long footnote. However, since this is a symposium on 
computation and an opportunity to permit readers to assess the 
methodology, I set forth here how this is done in more than cursory 
fashion. 
The difficulties arise in part because the Calculators, although 
potentially well suited for the task, were not designed with my 
project in mind and therefore do not expose the underlying data from 
which certain computations were made. Instead, the Actuarial Value 
Calculators contain only “lossy82 compressed data” and represent 
healthcare expenses as a discrete distribution, which in fact they are 
not. Although for many purposes this lossy compression of the data 
would be sufficient, for understanding Transitional Reinsurance, it is 
not. This is so because the attachment points and claims limits of the 
Transitional Reinsurance policies simply may not correspond with 
the buckets in the Actuarial Value Calculator. Therefore, although 
we can directly observe the mean claims of people with claims 
between $50,000 and $100,000, and we cannot do this with respect 
to people with mean claims between $60,000 and $100,000, which is 
what we need to do the requisite computations on the costs of 
reinsurance. To do the computation properly, we need to derive a 
plausible continuous distribution. 
Here is an illustration of what is involved. Let us consider the 
projected distribution of covered healthcare expenses for the “AVC 
[Actuarial Value Calculator] population” among people who 
purchased a Gold plan in 2016. We can obtain this distribution by 
                                                     
 82. There are two types of data compression: lossy and non-lossy. In lossy 
compression, there is not necessarily a unique set of uncompressed data that can be 
reverse engineered out of the compressed data. There may be multiple sets of the 
original data that could map to precisely the same compressed form. The JPEG 
compression method used for photos and MP3 method used for audio are examples 
of lossy compression. What Lossless File Formats Are & Why You Shouldn’t 
Convert Lossy to Lossless, HOWTOGEEK.COM, http://www.howtogeek.com/142174/ 
what-lossless-file-formats-are-why-you-shouldnt-convert-lossy-to-lossless/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4QRJ-EY6C] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
  In theory, multiple songs could have exactly the same MP3. In lossless 
compression, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the original and 
compressed data. The PNG compression algorithm often used for web graphics, the 
WAV format sometimes used for audio are examples of lossless compression, id., as 
is the ZIP file often used to compress text or other computer files. The importance of 
data compression is the subject of the television series Silicon Valley. Silicon Valley, 
HBO, http://www.hbo.com/silicon-valley/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/VSQ5-
CNHJ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).  
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examining the “Gold Cont. Table – Combined” tab of the Actuarial 
Value Calculator for 2016. What we learn from that tab is that 
39,750 people (1.02%) of the 3,886,699 people in the sample 
projected to purchase Gold policies will have covered expenses 
between $50,000 and $100,000 and that the mean expense of those 
within that “bucket” will be $67,790. But of course, not everyone 
who has annual health expenses within that bucket will have 
precisely the mean value of expenses. Probably no one will. 
Although the Actuarial Value Calculator shows the distribution of 
health expenses as discrete—everyone within a bucket pays the mean 
amount within the bucket—in doing so, the Actuarial Value 
Calculator is collapsing and making opaque the underlying data (or 
process) from which it was derived. And so, if we have to look, as 
we will, at the expenses of people whose expenses range from, for 
example, $60,000 up to some certain value, we need to recreate that 
underlying data.  
There are, in fact, an infinite number of distributions of 
healthcare expenses between $50,000 and $100,000 that could result 
in a mean of $67,790. CMS lost information when it created the 
Actuarial Value Calculators. Here is one possible distribution: a 21% 
chance of having expenses of $51,000 and a 79% chance of having 
expenses of $72,253. Here is another: a 17% chance of having 
expenses of $50,068 and an 83% chance of having expenses of 
$71,419. Here is yet another one: a continuous distribution whose 
probability density function is a line with a slope of ͸Ǥͻʹ כ ͳͲିଵ଴ 
and a y-intercept of 0.000071912.  
There is, however, a distribution known as the “maximum 
entropy distribution” that is probably the best one to use to make the 
needed calculations.83 A maximum entropy distribution is the one 
that makes the fewest assumptions about the shape of the unknown. 
And for continuous distributions lying within a certain interval and 
with a specified mean, which is precisely what we have here, the 
maximum entropy distribution is what is known as a truncated 
exponential distribution.84 Although there is no known closed form 
                                                     
 83. E.T. Jaynes, Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics, 106 PHYS. 
REV. 620, 630 (1957) (“In the problem of prediction, the maximization of entropy is 
not an application of a law of physics, but merely a method of reasoning which 
ensures that no unconscious arbitrary assumptions have been introduced.”). 
 84. See DANA KELLY & CURTIS SMITH, BAYESIAN INFERENCE FOR 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDEBOOK 190 (2011). The 
probability density function of a truncated exponential distribution may be written as 
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solution (a mathematical formula) to determine the parameters of the 
exponential distribution given the intervals of the bucket and the 
mean of the distribution,85 one can still find the result using fancy 
forms of trial and error (“numeric analysis”). The method used for 
this Article was the Nelder-Mead algorithm,86 in which one searches 
a parameter space—here the parameter to an exponential 
distribution—so as to minimize the square of the difference between 
the known mean of the bucket and the computed mean of a truncated 
exponential distribution with that parameter.87  
What needs to be done therefore is to find, for each of the 
eighty-four buckets for each of the four metal levels for each of the 
four years of Actuarial Value Calculators 2014-2017 (844 different 
buckets altogether), the truncated exponential distribution that is the 
maximum entropy distribution within that range. We can then create 
what is known as a “mixture distribution” that provides a continuous 
representation of the healthcare expenses for each year and for each 
metal level. A mixture distribution is a compound distribution that 
first randomly determines what bucket the random variable is in and 
then determines where within the bucket the random variable falls. 
Once we have this mixture distribution—and the enterprise of 844 
instances of trial and error takes about a minute on a modern high-
end personal computer—we have the data in a form on which we can 
perform the needed computations. 
To illustrate, consider the distribution of healthcare expenses of 
individuals projected to purchase a Gold policy in 2016. The graphic 
                                                                                                                
௘షೖೣ௞
௘షೌೖି௘ష್ೖ
 for ܽ ൑ ݔ ൑ ܾ and zero otherwise, where ܽ is the lower bound of the 
truncation interval, ܾ is the upper bound of the truncation interval and ݇ is a 
parameter that affects the slope of the function. 
 85. It may surprise some to learn that there are many mathematical 
equations for which there is no “closed form” solution, i.e., a mathematical 
expression that contains numbers and elementary functions such as trigonometric 
functions, exponential functions, and basic mathematical operations. There is 
nothing that one would conventionally call a formula. For good discussions, see 
Jonathan M. Borwein & Richard E. Crandall, Closed Forms: What They Are and 
Why We Care, 60 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 50 (2013); Maxwell 
Rosenlicht, Integration in Finite Terms, 79 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTHLY 963 
(1972). For a recitation of the traditional wisdom, see THE INDIGO GIRLS, LEAST 
COMPLICATED (Epic Records 1994) (“Some long ago when we were taught [t]hat for 
whatever kind of puzzle you got [y]ou just stick the right formula in.”).  
 86. J.A. Nelder & R. Mead, A Simplex Method for Function Minimization, 7 
COMPUTER J. 308 (1965). 
 87. This is the method that was in fact employed on this project. I found 
that it worked better and faster than seemingly more direct alternatives such as 
Newton’s method for finding the roots of a mathematical expression. 
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below shows the “probability density function” of that distribution.88 
With a little calculus, we can compute the expected value of claims. 
This is the amount an insurer would need to charge (absent loading 
charges) in order to break even if it in fact faced such a population 
and there were no reinsurance. And in fact, for the Gold 2016 group, 
that number is $5,666. If the loading factor—the amount for 
overhead, nonclaims expenses, and profit—is 17.7%, which 
corresponds to the permitted 85% Medical Loss Ratio required by 
other parts of the ACA,89 this means the breakeven premium would 
need to be $6,666. 
Figure 12 
PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION FOR GOLD CLAIMS IN 2016 
 
Again, with a little calculus, one can also compute the expected 
amount the reinsurer (here the government) would be expected to 
pay on such claims for any set of reinsurance parameters: an 
attachment point, a payment rate, and a claims cap.90 The table below 
                                                     
 88. The x-axis is log scaled because otherwise the vast majority of claims 
that are less than $10,000 are square-inched into a tiny left hand part of the graphic.  
 89. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b) (2010). 
 90. There is a complication. The continuance tables contained in the 
Actuarial Value Calculator refer to the amount the insured incurs in covered claims, 
not to the amount the insurer pays. In fact, however, the insurer pays less than the 
incurred covered claims because some of the claim is generally paid for by the 
insured (cost sharing). Therefore, in order to perfectly compute the value of the 
reinsurance, one would have to know the distribution not of incurred claims but of 
the amount the insurer paid. That precise information is not available. One can, 
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shows what that would be for the original 2014 parameters, the 
revised 2014 parameters,91 the 2015 original parameters, the 2015 
final parameters, and the 2016 parameters. The figure is shown as an 
absolute amount, as a fraction of expected claims, and as a fraction 
of expected break-even premium. The way to read this table is to 
note that for a Silver plan offered in 2014, the absolute value of the 
Transitional Reinsurance subsidy was $339.50 (under the original 
2014 parameters), $563 under the final 2014 parameters, and 
$237.70 under the final 2015 parameters. Or for a Gold plan offered 
in 2016, the absolute value of the Transitional Reinsurance subsidy 
would have been $443.60 under the original 2014 parameters but just 
$170.40 under the 2016 parameters. 
                                                                                                                
however, estimate the amount the insurer paid on relevant claims by subtracting 
from each claim the maximum out of pocket limit for the applicable policy for that 
year and then clipping the difference so that it is never negative. To compute the 
maximum out of pocket limit, the QHP Landscape Individual Market files were 
retrieved from data.healthcare.gov for 2014, 2015, and 2016. For each metal level, 
the mean medical maximum out of pocket limit was computed. Since this method is 
imperfect, I tested to see how much it mattered. It is fair to say that small errors in 
the estimate of the maximum out of pocket limit would not substantially affect the 
conclusions of this Article. 
 91. The Obama administration revised its original plans for reinsurance for 
both 2014 and 2015. In 2014, it ultimately lowered the attachment point from 
$60,000 to $45,000 and increased the payment rate to 100%. In 2015, it ultimately 
lowered the attachment point from $70,000 to $45,000. See Chandler, supra note 74 
(arguing that these reductions were illegal insofar as they resulted in the United 
States Treasury not receiving certain funds that the ACA had promised to it). 




We can view the same information not as an absolute amount 
but as a percentage of expected premiums. These figures thus tell us 
the amount that the Transitional Reinsurance reduced the breakeven 
premium for the hypothetical populations referenced in the Actuarial 
Value Calculator. We read the table the same way. Because of the 
Transitional Reinsurance finally implemented in 2014, a Bronze plan 
in 2014 ultimately had (for the hypothetical population) a break-even 
premium about 10% lower than it otherwise would have had. A 
Bronze plan in 2015 had a break-even premium that was different by 
5% than it would have had if no Transitional Reinsurance existed. 
And a Bronze plan in 2016 will, if the reinsurance parameters do not 
change, have a break-even premium that is different by 3% than it 
would have if no Transitional Reinsurance existed.  
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Figure 14 
 
So, we can now reach a major conclusion. Assuming the data 
within the Actuarial Value Calculator was actually correct, the phase 
out of Transitional Reinsurance likely played some role in the 
premium increases seen between 2015 and 2016; it was very 
unlikely, however, to have been the dominant factor. Going from a 
5% subsidy to a 3% subsidy for Bronze, Silver, and Gold, and from a 
5% subsidy to a 2% subsidy for Platinum simply cannot explain 
premium increases in excess of 10%. There clearly was much more 
going on. 
And going forward, will the likely elimination of Transitional 
Reinsurance in 2017 make a big difference? My computations 
suggest that it will make a small difference only. Were the 2016 
levels of reinsurance to remain in place in 2017, gross premiums 
would likely be about 3% lower for most plans. While that is not a 
trivial amount, neither is it likely determinative in the stability of the 
ACA. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Actuarial Value Calculator created pursuant to the 
Affordable Care Act may be a harbinger in the use of computation in 
regulation. It provides a government created tool under which private 
parties determine whether their product complies with federal 
regulatory norms and then provides a signal that communicates the 
output of the calculator to the consumer. In theory, there is much to 
be said for the use of complex calculators. The decision to use a 
calculator permits government to engage in more sophisticated 
regulation of financial products and probably physical products as 
well. Constraints on public and private behaviors can better match 
the complex facts of the domain in which the calculator operates. It 
creates somewhat of an even playing field for competitors in 
understanding the regulatory requirements. If done right, it also 
makes regulation more transparent by letting regulated entities and at 
least a few members of the interested public see, at a far more 
precise level of detail, exactly how the regulations operate. As we 
have seen, formulation of the Calculator can also liberate data that 
can be repurposed to consider the effect of other regulations—here 
the otherwise somewhat inscrutable Transitional Reinsurance 
program. 
There are burdens that come with greater use of Calculators, 
however. These burdens were not well met thus far with the 
Actuarial Value Calculator. To satisfy administrative law precepts, 
the computations must be truly open, as should the data that 
underlies the computations. Code should meet standards in the 
computer industry for clarity, commenting, and modularity. 
Computations should be falsifiable through use of automated testing; 
hand testing of a few cases on objects as complex as the Actuarial 
Value Calculator are likely to be insufficient. This means that the 
Calculators should be created in a way such that they can be called as 
a function from other programs and debugged with automated 
assistance as with other programs. There must be ways for users to 
provide timely and effective feedback when they determine that the 
code is having unintended results or when they determine, as is the 
case with the Actuarial Value Calculator, that the description of the 
data does not match what is actually provided. In short, since the 
Calculator effectively acts as law, it should be treated as law. 
Finally, the Actuarial Value Calculator sheds light on the 
Transitional Reinsurance program under the ACA. The claims 
distributions implicitly embedded in the data segments of the 
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Calculator coupled with the use of some basic calculus shows that 
Transitional Reinsurance has been very helpful to insurers and has, 
in competitive markets, helped keep prices for exchange policies 
lower than they would be otherwise. But if we see continuing 
increases on the order of 8% to 10% per year for gross premiums on 
the Exchanges or for particular subsets of policies, such as Gold and 
Platinum policies or high choice policies such as Preferred Provider 
Organizations, it is difficult to see how the phase out of Transitional 
Reinsurance could be responsible. Other, and potentially more 
troubling, forces are at work. 

